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Fight or freeze? Individual differences in investors’ motivational 
systems and trading in experimental asset markets 
Abstract 
We analyze investors’ trading behavior, particularly their coping with fundamental shocks in asset 
value, depending on individual differences in the sensitivity of two basic neurophysiological 
systems—the Behavioral Approach System (BAS), the ‘driving force’ of human behavior, and the 
Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS), its ‘braking system’. By analyzing 15 independent 
experimental asset markets with a total of 171 participants, we find that differences in BAS and 
BIS sensitivity affect trading in both ‘normal’ and shock-trading environments: under normal 
trading conditions, individuals with a more sensitive BAS are more active traders, prefer riskier 
portfolios, and generate higher individual overall profits. High BIS subjects generate lower 
scalping and overall profits. Fundamental shocks generally reinforce the preference of high BAS 
investors for riskier portfolios, while positive shocks ‘unfreeze’ high BIS investors: they trade 
more frequently and generate higher profits. At the market level, normal trading in markets with 
a high BIS median is associated with lower volatility, compared to low BIS median markets, while 
greater concentration of traders’ BAS scores around the mean is associated with better efficiency 
and liquidity, compared to markets with lower BAS kurtosis. In high BIS median markets, 
positive shocks lead to improved efficiency, lower bid-ask spread, and lower volatility. We 
observe no significant differences in market-level reactions to negative shocks. 
 
JEL classification: C91; G02; G11; D03; D81.  
PsycINFO classification: 3100; 3600. 
Keywords: Individual decision making; Investment decisions; Behavioral Approach 
System/Behavioral Inhibition System; Experimental asset markets; Fundamental shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
Field and laboratory studies have reported deviations from the proposition that prices reflect 
fundamental values, and adjust quickly and correctly to new information about changes in this 
value (e.g., Bloomfield et al., 2009). The empirical evidence is reflected in behavioral models of 
market over- or underreaction and momentum (e.g., Barberis et al., 1998; Daniel et al., 1998). 
These behavioral explanations argue that cognitive biases provide reasons as to why anomalies 
characterize financial market behavior (Ackert and Deaves, 2010; Stracca, 2004). Beyond 
documenting the existence of biases, scholars have, however, also uncovered substantial 
heterogeneity across individuals—in their susceptibility to biases (e.g., Chen et al., 2007; Da Costa 
et al., 2006; Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2005); trading styles (e.g., Barber and Odean, 2001; Deaves et 
al., 2009); and trading performance (e.g., Oliven and Rietz, 2004; Smith et al., 1988).1  
While demographic and socioeconomic variables appear to play a role (e.g., Ackert and 
Church, 2001; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Fellner and Maciejovsky, 2007; Forbes and Kara, 2010; Loibl 
and Hira, 2009; McInish and Srivastava, 1984; Powell and Ansic, 1997; Sachse, et al., 2012), a 
considerable part of this variation remains unexplained. A nascent literature, hence, advances 
differences in personality as a complementary explanation. Scholars have studied the influence of 
personality traits such as locus-of-control (Chui, 2001; Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2005; McInish, 
1980, 1982), self-monitoring (Biais et al., 2005), sensation seeking (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 
2009), chronic self-regulatory focus (Liu, 2011), and the ‘Big Five’ (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2005), 
on individuals’ trading and investment. Yet, important questions remain unanswered. For 
example, other studies suggest that the impact of individual traits may be too limited to 
prominently and generally explain variations in trading (e.g., Lo et al., 2005).   
This study, therefore, analyzes the impact of two fundamental motivational systems that 
are central to theories of personality psychology (Brenner et al., 2005) and rooted in human 
neurophysiology—the Behavioral Approach System (BAS) and the Behavioral Inhibition System (BIS) 
                                               
1 We use the terms ‘investor’ and ‘trader’ interchangeably to refer to individuals who trade for their own accounts.  
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(Fowles, 1980, 1993; Gray, 1982, 1987). Despite their fundamental nature, no study has, to date, 
analyzed their influence on financial decision making. To the best of our knowledge, only three 
studies have examined their impact on economic decision making, and all of them did so in 
different task environments (gambling tasks) (Van Honk et al., 2002; Franken and Muris, 2005; 
Kim and Lee, 2011). Scholars argue that much of human behavior is driven by these two systems, 
and that individuals differ in the sensitivity of their BAS and BIS to environmental signals of 
reward and punishment (Carver and White, 1994; Depue and Iacono 1989; Fowles, 1980, 1993; 
Gray, 1982, 1987). Together, they are at the heart of interpersonal differences in appetitive 
motivation (BAS), i.e. the tendency to move towards something pleasant, and aversive motivation 
(BIS), i.e. the tendency to move away from the threat of something unpleasant.  
Specifically, the BAS stimulates activities in response to reward signals (e.g., anticipation 
of a monetary reward). It activates approach behaviors, has been referred to as the ‘engine’ or 
‘driving force’ of human behavior, and is neurophysiologically associated with the motor 
programming system (Gray, 1994). High BAS sensitivity appears to be linked to traits such as 
impulsivity (Gray, 1994), and novelty seeking (Cloninger, 1987), to states such as positive affect 
(Watson et al., 1999) and energetic arousal (Thayer, 1986), and has been associated with a 
tendency to engage in goal-directed efforts (Caver and White, 1994): faced with the prospect of 
obtaining a desired outcome, high BAS individuals will ‘fight’ more vigorously in order to get it.  
The second system—BIS—governs aversive motivation and is neurophysiologically 
associated with the septohippocampal system (Depue and Iacono, 1989; Gray, 1994). Its function 
is to halt ongoing behavior while processing potential threat signals (Gray, 1982, 1987). It 
responds to signals of punishment, non-reward, and novelty by increasing attention, and by 
halting behavior that may have negative consequences. The BIS stimulates withdrawal from or 
avoidance of behaviors that may have adverse implications; high BIS activation is associated with 
increased attention, vigilance and anxiety (e.g., Fowles, 1988; Quay, 1988). Therefore, BIS 
activation is argued to block movement towards goals (Carver and White, 1994). The BIS has 
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been linked to avoidant and inhibitory traits such as anxiety and neuroticism (Gray, 1994), and to 
states such as negative affect (Gray, 1994). Generally, higher BIS sensitivity appears to be related 
to proneness to anxiety and reduced goal-directed efforts (Caver and White, 1994): faced with the 
prospect of a potentially negative outcome, high BIS individuals are more likely to ‘freeze’.  
This paper takes an explorative approach to shed first light on the impact of BAS/BIS on 
trading. We hypothesize that individual differences in BAS/BIS sensitivity influence investors’ 
behavior in general, and their coping with fundamental shocks—defined as sudden changes in 
the expected value of a (risky) asset due to new information—in particular. Specifically, we expect 
that high BIS individuals focus more on the potential negative consequences (‘threat signals’) of 
holding risky assets, whereas high BAS traders emphasize the potential upside (‘reward signals’). 
A looming shock is likely to reinforce these tendencies. Therefore, this study addresses two 
research questions. First, under ‘normal’ trading conditions, how do individual differences in 
BAS/BIS sensitivity affect individual trading behavior and outcomes (e.g., profits and frequency), 
and how does market composition with respect to BAS/BIS affect market performance 
(efficiency, liquidity, and volatility)? Second, how do individual- and market-level reactions to 
fundamental shocks differ depending on differences in BAS/BIS sensitivity?  
We investigate these questions in an asset market experiment with 171 subjects. Our 
analyses reveal, first, that individual trading behavior and outcomes as well as market 
performance under normal trading conditions are significantly affected by differences in 
BAS/BIS sensitivity. High BAS individuals hold riskier portfolios with higher numbers of shares, 
trade more frequently, including trading for the purpose of scalping, and generate higher profits. 
High BIS individuals generate lower scalping and overall trading profits. At the market level, high 
BIS median is associated with lower volatility, compared to low BIS median markets, while 
greater concentration of traders’ BAS scores around the mean is related to better efficiency and 
liquidity, compared to markets with lower BAS kurtosis. Second, reactions to fundamental shocks 
are also affected by differences in BAS/BIS sensitivity, especially at the individual level. Both 
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types of shocks reinforce high BAS traders’ preference for riskier portfolios and they engage even 
more frequently in (scalping) trades. Following negative (but not positive) shocks, high BAS 
individuals underreact strongly. High BIS traders ‘unfreeze’ in response to positive shocks: they 
trade more frequently and generate higher profits. Negative shocks do not alter their behavior 
significantly. In high BIS median markets, positive shocks lead to improved efficiency, lower bid-
ask spread, and lower volatility. We do not observe any significant market-level effects in 
response to negative shocks. 
2. Experimental Design and Procedure 
2.1 Participants 
171 subjects from various fields of study, 112 females (mean age=21.49; sd=2.39) and 59 males 
(mean age=21.17; sd=2.39), participated. They received performance-dependent monetary 
rewards (for details, see section 2.3 Procedure).  
2.2 Design 
We used a computerized experimental market programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The 
basic setup was similar to previous market experiments (e.g., Fellner and Maciejovsky, 2007; 
Gneezy et al., 2003; Weber and Welfens, 2007). Participants could sequentially trade multiple 
units of a risky single-period asset in a continuous open-book double auction market in a 
sequence of twelve four-minute trading periods. At the beginning of each period, a trader was 
endowed with 1,330 units of an experimental currency (‘ECUs’) and five units of the risky asset. 
There was one type of risky asset. At the end of each period, each unit of the asset was a lottery 
ticket worth a certain amount of money. The exact value (‘dividend’) was state-dependent. At the 
beginning of each round, four states—A, B, C, and D—were possible, equally likely, and 
independent from previous rounds. If at the end of a period state A applied, each unit of the 
asset was worth 0 ECUs. B, C, and D resulted in values of 100, 300, and 400 ECUs. The state 
that applied to a round was determined by a computerized random draw after trading had ended. 
A message on the computer screens revealed the realized draw. Subsequently, the next period 
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started. As in Gneezy et al. (2003) and Weber and Welfens (2007), all subjects had the same 
information and were fully informed about all possible states and probabilities.  
Traders could submit bids to buy and orders to sell at any time during a trading period. 
All traders were instantaneously informed about all submitted bids and orders. When a unit was 
traded, the accepted bid or order was withdrawn from the market, and all traders were informed 
that a trade had occurred at that price. All bids and orders were for one unit only. In each period, 
if a trader bought (sold) a unit, the price was subtracted from (added to) her cash balance, and 
one unit of the asset was added to (subtracted from) her portfolio. A trader’s earnings for the 
period were equal to: 1,330 + [prices received for units sold] – [prices paid for units bought] + 
[number of units in portfolio at the end of the period] x [value of the asset as determined by the 
lottery draw]. At the beginning of the next period, all portfolios were re-initialized. Traders could 
not use accumulated earnings from earlier rounds and were not allowed to go short in either 
assets or cash. An individual improvement rule was enforced. 
During each session, we administered two trading treatments to the same participants 
(within-subject design). In treatment 1 (T1; NORM), trading continued uninterrupted for four 
minutes. In treatment 2 (T2; SHOCK), during each four-minute interval, trading was interrupted 
after two minutes and subjects were confronted with an exogenous shock in the form of new 
information about the value of the asset. Out of the initially possible four states, we randomly 
eliminated either the two low-payout states A and B (positive/high shock), or the two high-
payout states C and D (negative/low shock). Both types of shocks were equally likely. Following 
a shock, all outstanding bids and orders were cancelled, and trading continued for another two 
minutes.2 Endowments were not re-initialized after a shock, but at the beginning of the next 
                                               
2 In deleting all outstanding bids and asks after each shock, we follow the design of Weber and Welfens (2007). 
While retaining outstanding bids and asks would constitute a more realistic alternative design option, we opted for 
following the design by Weber and Welfens (2007) for two main reasons. First, it allows for controlling for 
idiosyncratic lengths and depths of order books at the market level, and for identifying characteristic momentum 
patterns. Second, not clearing the order book would have ‘automatically’ induced an additional amount of 
underreaction. For example, a trader who had posted a limit order indicating her willingness to buy the asset at a 
price of 200 just prior to a negative shock would indeed have been forced to purchase it from the first seller quick 
enough to accept the outstanding bid after the low shock. Even if the first trader would have tried to enter an 
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four-minutes trading period.3 In the instructions for T2, participants were informed about the 
occurrence of a shock, but not whether it would be positive or negative. 
2.3 Procedure 
The experiment was conducted in the ELSE lab at Utrecht University, the Netherlands, with a 
total of 15 sessions; 15 subjects per session—225, in total—were recruited by announcements 
and were asked to fill in an online questionnaire two weeks in advance to collect data on 
psychometric measures and investment experience, of which 204 subjects (13.6 students per 
session) filled in the questionnaire. Of these, 171 subjects (between 8-15 students per session 
with an average of 11.4) showed up in the lab two weeks later. We matched the data from the 
survey and the experiment using a unique, random computer-generated identifier to ensure 
anonymity. No subject was allowed to participate more than once and upon entering the lab, 
subjects were randomly seated behind PCs.  
Following the two trading treatments, an additional set of three treatments was run in 
order to assess loss aversion (T3; Rabin (2000), Gächter et al. (2007); separately incentivized), risk 
aversion (T4; Holt and Laury (2002); separately incentivized), and overconfidence (T5; similar to 
Biais et al. (2005)), which are used as control variables, but are not analyzed separately here. 
Because they were always played last, we expect no confounding effects on the results reported 
here.4 Subjects only received information about the immediately imminent treatment.5 After the 
first set of instructions was distributed, subjects traded during two practice periods in which no 
feedback was provided. After a clear break, actual trading started. At the end of each session, 
each participant learned about her payoff via a message on her computer screen, and was paid 
                                                                                                                                                   
improved (in this case, lower) price in response to the shock, it is likely that this would have taken her longer than it 
would have taken the (lucky) seller to simply click on ‘accept’ to secure the previous bid of 200. The resulting trade 
would have looked like underreaction on the part of the buyer, although the buyer was perfectly aware of the 
implications of the shock and would have entered a much lower bid price for a new limit order. The design 
implemented in this study, therefore, represents a more conservative scenario for assessing underreaction and allows 
us to investigate in a more controlled manner the ‘pure’ treatment effect on individuals’ underreaction. 
3 The described experimental design builds on the standard assumption that individuals derive utility from monetary 
gains. Note, though, that we do not assume a particular shape of the utility function.  
4 We do not report overconfidence in the results here, because it never showed any significant effect. When included 
(in unreported robustness checks; available upon request from the authors), it does not alter our results qualitatively.   
5 Upon request, the complete set of instructions and the experimental data are available from the authors. 
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her earnings in private. Total experimental earnings consisted of payoffs from trading, and the 
payoffs from T3 and T4. All three components of total earnings were independent of each other. 
A subject’s trading profit was based on one randomly chosen period, for which her earnings were 
calculated according to the aforementioned formula. The exchange rate was 0.008, resulting in an 
expected payoff from trading of €18.64. The average realized payoff per subject was €18.16 
(sd=7.48; min=.18; max=39.38). The overall average payoff (including T3 and T4) was €26.95 
(sd=8.06; min=5.03; max=49.23). On average, the experiment took approximately 120 minutes. 
3. Methods 
We separately analyze the following ‘market types’: (i) normal trading (T1; NORM), (ii) pre-shock 
trading (T2; sub-treatment: T2-PRE), and post-shock trading, divided into (iii) high shock (T2; 
sub-treatment: T2-POST HI), and (iv) low shock (T2; sub-treatment: T2-POST LO). Each of 
these market types was administered in each session with a different market composition (group 
of traders). We henceforth refer to a combination of composition and market type as ‘market’. 
3.1 Individual-Level Variables  
The following dependent variables are defined at the subject-period level of observation. Number 
of stocks and Trading frequency capture trading strategies. Number of stocks refers to the absolute 
number of stocks in a subject’s portfolio (i) at the end of each period of 240 seconds of normal 
trading, (ii) at the end of each interval of 120 seconds of pre-shock trading, (iii) at the end of 120 
seconds of trading after a positive shock, and (iv) at the end of 120 seconds of trading after a 
negative shock. If this number is greater (smaller) than five, a trader was a net buyer (seller) of 
stocks with a correspondingly higher (lower) risk exposure than at the start of the period. Trading 
frequency is measured as the absolute number of trades a subject was involved in during a period. 
Trading profits, Scalping profits, Scalping frequency, and Underreaction assess trading performance. 
Trading profits are measured as an individual’s total assets at the end of a period (cash and shares), 
with shares valued at their expected value prior to the realized lottery draw. Scalping profits capture 
performance when trading for the purpose of making profits from selling high and buying low 
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(rather than potentially benefiting from a high dividend). They are measured as the average profit 
per stock Πm,i of trader i in market m, benchmarked against the average price of a stock in the 
market (henceforth ‘market price’).6  
ii
S
s
B
b ibimimis
im BS
ppppi i
+
−+−
=Π ∑ ∑= =1 1 ,,,,
,
)()(
    (1) 
For traders who did not sell or buy any stocks in a period, Πm,i=0. Scalping frequency 
assesses the frequency with which a trader trades for the purpose of buying and selling, rather 
than for the purpose of changing the number of stocks in her portfolio. It is measured as the 
minimum of all shares sold and all shares bought in a period.7 Underreaction assesses the degree to 
which a trader is (too) slow in adapting to a change in fundamental value. Analogously to Weber 
and Welfens (2007), and with vt representing the risk-neutral expected value of a stock 
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The greater Ui, the more trader i underreacts. In contrast to Weber and Welfens (2007), 
who define underreaction with average trading prices at the market level, we measure 
underreaction at the individual level. This has two advantages. First, we can distinguish between 
buying and selling per individual, because only traders who sell (buy) below (above) the expected 
value after a high (low) shock underreact. The counterparties, in contrast, do not underreact, but, 
                                               
6
 For example, if Si=2, stocks are sold at ps,i=210 (with s=1) and ps,i=205 (with s=2) and Bi=1 stock is bought at 
pb,i=197 (with b=1), and pm,i equals 200, then scalping generates Πm,i=(210-200+205-200+200-197)/(2+1)=6 ECU 
per traded stock of trader i. In order to keep the market price independent from a subject’s own trading prices, we 
exclude the latter and compute the market price pm,i by averaging the prices of all other traders in the market. 
7 For example, if a subject bought three stocks and sold four, the scalping frequency is three, the total trading 
frequency is seven, and the number of stocks (in the final portfolio) is four .The total trading frequency (Trading 
frequency; see above) is a combination of scalping frequency and the number of stocks. Total trading frequency is the 
sum of twice her scalping frequency plus the absolute difference between the initial and final number of stocks in her 
portfolio. In the example above, this is: (2*3)+|(5-4)|=7. 
8 The fundamental value of a stock in normal and pre-shock trading is 200 ECUs, 350 ECUs in high post-shock 
trading and 50 ECUs in low post-shock trading. 
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by buying low/selling high, exploit opportunities opened up by underreacting traders. Second, 
market risk premiums do not bias our results. At the market level, post-shock trades below the 
new expected value may not indicate underreaction, but simply the risk premium of a risk-averse 
market. At the individual level, though, a specific trader may underreact even if the market, on 
average, does not. Hence, in comparing an individual’s underreaction to the market’s average, the 
market’s risk premium is implicitly accounted for. 
In order to compare trading before and after a shock, for each of the dependent variables 
(with the exception of Underreaction), we deduct an individual’s pre-shock average from her 
corresponding post-shock average. The comparisons are measured separately for high and low 
post-shock trading. Per individual, all dependent variables are averaged per period, separately for 
normal, pre-shock, and high (low) post-shock trading. To account for differences in market 
composition, we follow prior literature (e.g., Lo et al., 2005) and mean-center and standardize all 
dependent variables at the market level. Thus, per individual and market type, we retain six 
observations, one per period—hence, 171*6=1,026 observations in the normal and the pre-shock 
market type. Each of the two post-shock market types has fewer observations, because per 
period there was either a high or a low shock. Together they add up to 1,026.9  
The independent variables, BAS and BIS, are measured using the BIS/BAS scales by 
Carver and White (1994). The BIS scale is a seven-item, four-point Likert-type scale. BAS is 
measured using the BAS Reward Responsiveness (BAS-RR) sub-scale, which is a five-item, four-
point Likert-type scale. In order to facilitate interpretation, we re-coded the scores such that a 
higher score implies higher sensitivity. Using confirmatory factor analyses, we established that the 
measurements are distinct. Further, to validate our measurements individually, we ran reliability 
tests and common factor analyses per scale. The largest factor in each measurement has an 
eigenvalue well above one (1.276 for BAS, and 2.470 for BIS). The difference to the eigenvalue 
                                               
9
 As a robustness check, we also averaged all values per individual and market across all trading periods in a session, 
resulting in only 171 observations per market type (mean-centered and standardized per market). All results reported 
here remain qualitatively intact. 
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of the second-largest factor is substantial so that the eigenvalue of the latter is much smaller (for 
BAS, the difference is 1.242; for BIS, the difference is 2.204). We therefore do not exclude any 
items from the original scales. BIS (BAS) has a Cronbach’s α of .788 (.61). Both values exceed the 
critical threshold of 0.6 as defined by Bagozzi and Yi (1988). In line with Biais and Weber (2009), 
we focus on the deviations between subjects’ characteristics within the group in which they 
traded. Analogously to the dependent variables, we mean-centered and standardized all 
independent variables at the market level.10  
3.2 Market-Level Variables  
Informational efficiency assesses the degree to which market prices fully and correctly reflect all 
available information and thereby the true value of an underlying asset (Fama, 1970). We measure 
informational efficiency (Efficiency) as the root mean squared deviation of prices from the fully 
efficient true rational expectations price forecast (e.g., Theissen, 2000; Friedman, 1993). The root 
mean squared error (RMSE) measures the quality of information aggregation in a market. A 
lower RMSE indicates a more efficient market. The RMSE for a period is defined as: 
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The true asset value in period t is denoted as vt . The index j characterizes the trading 
price during a specific period with nt representing the total number of trades by the end of period 
t. Market liquidity relates to the degree to which an asset can be (re-)sold without causing a 
significant movement in the market price and without losing value substantially. The bid-ask 
spread is a widespread measure of liquidity (Liquidity) in field markets, which has also been 
employed in experimental asset markets (e.g., Theissen, 2000). Following Theissen (2000), we 
measure the quoted bid-ask spread as the average spread (ask minus bid) of open limit orders in a 
trading period t. We also assess the volatility of prices (Volatility), which is a measure for the 
variation over time of prices for an asset. Generally, higher volatility implies a wider distribution 
                                               
10
 All control variables, their measurements and sources are described in detail in Appendix A. 
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of possible final portfolio values. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation of traded prices 
during a period t.  
In exploring the effects of group (market) composition, we included a measure of (i) the 
average level and (ii) the heterogeneity of the attribute(s) of interest (e.g., Barrick, Stewart, 
Neubert, and Mount, 1998; Neuman, Wagner, and Christiansen, 1999). We assessed market 
composition with respect to BAS/BIS sensitivity using (i) the median of BAS and BIS scores 
(BAS median and BIS median) of all subjects in a market (session),11 and (ii) the kurtosis of the 
corresponding distributions (BAS kurtosis and BIS kurtosis), as it is concerned with the tails of the 
distribution (unlike, for example, the standard deviation).12 
4. Results 
4.1 Descriptives 
Figure 1 shows the average trading price per second, its smoothed 95% confidence interval, the 
number of limit orders in the system, and the number of trades executed (per eight seconds). In 
line with prior research, the average market price mostly lies below the fundamental value of 200 
(e.g., Deaves et al., 2009), which suggests a risk-averse market.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Figures 2 and 3 show the trading development in the shock treatments. Trading in the 
pre-shock phase is comparable to normal trading. In the post-shock phase, prices exhibit a 
characteristic momentum pattern as they drift towards the new fundamental value.13 After a high 
(low) shock, trading prices stay significantly below (above) the expected stock values for the first 
22 (34) seconds, before they converge to the new fundamental levels. This observation is 
consistent with the idea that at least some subjects used the pre-shock price as an anchor 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1973, 1974). With a value of 200 as an anchor, a post-shock selling 
price of 300 or a post-shock buying price of 100 look like a bargain, even though they are far 
                                               
11 The results are qualitatively robust but slightly weaker when using the mean. 
12 The main results are qualitatively robust to the inclusion of the inter-quartile range instead of kurtosis. 
13 Note that this is not an order book effect, because we cleared the order book at the announcement of a shock. 
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from their new fundamental values. Weber and Welfens (2007) found a similar momentum 
pattern, which they show to be caused by underreaction.  
Prior research has shown that investors are 50 per cent more likely to sell stocks that are 
above their purchase value than stocks that show a loss (Odean, 1998). In our experiment, too, 
subjects sold their stocks for a gain much quicker than for a loss. After a positive shock, many 
stocks sold for prices between 250 and 300, thus for a gain of 25-50 per cent compared to pre-
shock levels. After a negative shock, however, almost all trading was at prices below 100, where 
the stocks had lost more than 50 per cent. This asymmetry is consistent with loss aversion and 
the disposition effect (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Odean, 1998).14 
Kirchler (2009) observes a similar asymmetry in mispricing between markets with increasing and 
decreasing fundamental values.15 
Further, we observe changes in market risk attitude following the shocks. After a positive 
shock, most equilibrium prices were below the fundamental value: participants preferred to avoid 
risk. Following a negative shock, however, the average equilibrium price stayed exclusively above 
the fundamental value. The same participants now sought risk. This switch of risk attitudes from 
the gain to the loss domain is also consistent with prior studies (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). 
[INSERT FIGURES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
While there is some heterogeneity across sessions in terms of market size, trading 
frequency, and average market price,16 robustness checks show that our results are qualitatively 
robust to the deletion of outlier sessions (e.g., Session 14). This is in line with prior studies that 
have found that the size of experimental asset markets—for example, beyond a threshold of 
approximately eight traders—does not influence trading behavior significantly (e.g., Fellner and 
                                               
14 Interestingly, similar effects related to loss realization aversion and processes of anchoring and adjustment have 
recently been reported for real estate markets (e.g., Einio et al., 2008; Genesove and Mayer, 2001). 
15
 He reports that markets with bullish (i.e., above-average mean fundamental values) are characterized by a 
significantly lower absolute difference between prices and fundamental value compared to bearish markets (with a 
below-average mean fundamental values), implying that bullish markets exhibit a lower degree of underreaction. 
16 Table A2 in Appendix A2 reports the number of traders, the trading frequency, and the average market price per 
session. Because normal trading is twice as long as pre- or post-shock trading, trading frequencies are also 
approximately double as high. The average number of stocks is always five. It is therefore not reported in the table. 
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Maciejovsky, 2007). Table 1 reports the pairwise correlations of all explanatory variables at the 
individual level (averaged across all periods of a session), together with the basic descriptives.17 
No coefficient exceeds an absolute level of 0.36 (Age and Master_PhD). We test for 
multicollinearity by computing variance inflation factors (VIF). No independent variable exceeds 
a VIF-value of 1.52, with a mean of 1.24 for all explanatory variables, both of which are well 
below the established thresholds of 5.3 (Hair et al., 2006) and 10 (Belsley et al., 1980; 
Studenmund, 1992). Hence, multicollinearity is not a concern in this study. 
 [INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]  
We use multivariate OLS regression. To account for interdependences within markets 
(sessions), all standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using robust estimators of 
variance (Huber, 1967; White, 1980) that are clustered at the market (session) level for all 
individual-level (market-level) estimations. The results are qualitatively robust to the addition of 
session or period fixed effects. Joint parameter tests reveal, however, that session or period fixed 
effects do not add explanatory power to the specifications shown below. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the variables are standardized at the market level, which already corrects for 
unobserved effects at the session-period level.18  
4.2 T1-NORM Trading  
Table 2 reports results for individual-level analyses in the normal trading environment (T1-
NORM). First, investors with higher BAS sensitivity have a preference for riskier portfolios and 
are more active traders. They also trade more frequently for the purpose of scalping, and they 
generate higher overall trading profits. Second, higher BIS sensitivity is associated with 
significantly lower overall trading profits, and lower scalping profits.  
[INSERT TABLES 2 AND 3ABOUT HERE] 
                                               
17 The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum are reported for the unstandardized variables. We exclude 
the number of traders (market size) because it does not vary across individuals. When included, it shows no 
statistically significant pairwise correlation with any of the other variables reported. 
18
 Due to space constraints, all results shown refer to full model specifications, which include all independent 
variables. When included separately, the effects remain qualitatively robust (available upon request from the authors). 
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 Table 3 reports regressions for the effects of market composition in terms of BIS/BAS 
sensitivity on market-level outcomes for NORM trading (T1-NORM). Higher median BIS 
sensitivity is associated with significantly lower volatility. Higher BAS kurtosis (i.e., more mass at 
the center and thinner tails) is associated with a lower bid-ask spread and marginally associated 
with higher efficiency. In interpreting these market-level results (see also Table 6), it is important 
to note that high BIS (median) does not imply low BAS (median). Instead, the comparison is 
between high and low (median) BIS, and between high and low (median) BAS. 
4.3 T2-SHOCK Trading  
Table 4 reports differences between pre- and post-high-shock trading. The number of 
observations is lower, because only 40 out of 90 periods with shock trading were exposed to a 
high shock. For underreaction to a positive shock, we require that a trader sells at least one stock 
after a positive shock in order to be able to assess whether or not she exhibits underreaction. 
This happened in 275 (of 455) subject-period observations. Analogously, Table 5 reports the 
results after a negative shock; 50 (out of 90) periods were exposed to a negative shock (571 
subject-period observations). Of these, 368 observations record the purchase of at least one 
stock, allowing for the computation of underreaction. As Table 4 reveals, differences in both 
BAS and BIS sensitivity affect reactions to positive shocks at the individual level. Traders with a 
more sensitive BAS respond by restructuring their portfolios towards including more risky assets 
and by engaging more frequently in scalping, but fail to convert this into higher scalping profits. 
Subjects with higher BIS sensitivity react by trading more frequently. In the process, they 
generate significantly higher trading profits, compared to pre-shock trading. After a positive 
shock, neither higher BAS nor higher BIS sensitivity are associated with a stronger tendency 
towards underreaction. In contrast, Table 5 shows that differences in responses to negative 
shocks are driven solely by differences in BAS sensitivity. High BAS sensitivity traders react—
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again—by restructuring towards riskier portfolios. They trade more frequently relative to pre-
shock trading, and strongly underreact.19 Differences in BIS sensitivity have no significant effect.  
[INSERT TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 6 reports results for the effects of BIS/BAS market composition on market-level 
outcomes for post-shock trading following positive (Table 6; Panel (a); T2-POST-HI) and 
negative shocks (Table 6; Panel (b); T2-POST-LO). After a positive shock, a higher median BIS 
level is associated with lower bid-ask spread, greater informational efficiency, and reduced 
volatility, compared to pre-shock levels. After negative shocks, none of the individual coefficients 
is significant, neither is any of the market-model specifications (prob > F = .295 or higher). 
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
5. General Discussion and Conclusion 
This study reports results of an asset market experiment to examine the impact of interpersonal 
differences in BAS/BIS sensitivity on trading behavior and performance. We analyzed trading 
under ‘normal’ conditions, and in the presence of exogenous, random (positive/negative) shocks. 
In addition, we studied the impact of BAS/BIS market composition on market performance.  
At the individual level and under normal trading conditions, our results indicate that high 
BAS individuals are more active traders, prefer riskier portfolios, and generate higher overall 
profits. High BIS subjects generate lower scalping and overall trading profits. In terms of 
responses to shocks, high BAS traders respond to both negative and positive shocks with the 
same strategy: buying even more shares. This strategy appears sensible after high shocks, given 
that upward price adaptation is slow and prices remain below the new fundamental value mostly 
until trading closes. Following negative shocks, however, slow downward adaptation and market 
price levels well above the new fundamental value for most of the remaining trading time imply 
                                               
19 Note that the model for underreaction in Table 5 is over-specified (prob > F = 0.396), because the control 
variables are jointly statistically insignifcant. When including only BAS and BIS, the resulting model is jointly 
significant at the 10% level (prob > F = 0.072).   
 17
that, on average, this strategy is likely to result in lower trading profits. We interpret the observed 
pattern—increased preference for stocks independent of the direction of the shock—as follows.  
A positive shock raises the expected value of the risky asset and, at the same time, 
reduces the associated risk. This implies that shares become relatively more attractive compared 
to the pre-shock setting. Prior research shows that especially high BAS individuals respond to 
approach-motivating stimuli (e.g., a positive shock) with more pronounced attentional narrowing 
(Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2010). High BAS sensitivity has been associated with increased 
(decreased) likelihood judgments for positive (negative) events (Rose, 2009). Such narrowing of 
attention implies a heightened focus on the possibility of a positive outcome from possessing 
shares. In contrast, a negative shock decreases the expected value of the asset, and of an 
investor’s portfolio, and the more so the higher the proportion of shares held before the shock. 
Faced with a (substantially) reduced value of their portfolio following a negative shock, high BAS 
traders may try to ‘make the best of a bad job’. They will focus their attention on the potentially 
positive return to the risky asset, which— should it materialize— would allow them to 
compensate as much as possible for the drop in value of their portfolios. Further, high BAS 
traders responded to positive shocks by increasing the frequency of scalping trades (although not 
their scalping profits). In line with prior research that has pointed to high BAS individuals’ more 
pronounced (over-)confidence (Kim and Lee, 2011), we speculate that a possible reason for this 
behavior is that high BAS investors might be more (over-)confident regarding their trading skills 
and/or understanding of the implications of the shock, compared to low BAS individuals.  
 Positive shocks ‘unfreeze’ high BIS investors, inducing them to trade more frequently and 
to generate higher trading profits. However, negative shocks do not alter high BIS investors’ 
trading behavior significantly. Indeed, research has shown that persons who are highly sensitive 
to punishment signals are more likely to develop negative expectations when faced with adverse 
stimuli (Avila et al., 1999; Zinbarg and Mohlman, 1998). As the BIS is responsive to signals of 
punishment, high BIS individuals’ attentional focus is likely to be on the downside potential of 
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risky assets—i.e., on the possibility of a realized value below the fundamental value. Negative 
shocks may simply be interpreted as a confirmation, implying that the effects of this skeptical 
view on trading behavior were already fully reflected in high BIS traders’ pre-shock trading, while 
high shocks are positive surprises, hence significantly altering behavior (and performance). 
At the market level, under normal trading conditions, markets with a high BIS median 
(compared to low BIS median markets) are characterized by lower volatility. As they trade less 
frequently and arguably more cautiously, high BIS traders have a tendency to stick more closely 
to trading around the fundamental value, especially when it comes to purchasing shares. Further, 
heterogeneity within a market in terms of BAS sensitivity affects market outcomes. Higher BAS 
kurtosis (greater mass of individuals’ BAS scores at the center) is associated with better efficiency 
and liquidity, compared to lower BAS kurtosis markets. This makes sense as the presence of 
more extreme BAS traders (fatter tails with very high and low BAS sensitivity) is likely to drive 
prices further apart, leading to a higher bid-ask spread. Also, high BAS traders are likely to be 
more willing to ‘gamble’ on positive outcomes of the lottery draw and, consequently, to pay 
higher prices, leading to a higher RMSE. For shock-trading, positive shocks in high BIS median 
markets (compared to low BIS median markets) lead to improved efficiency, lower bid-ask 
spread, and lower volatility. In line with the individual-level results, a positive shock ‘unfreezes’ 
high BIS traders. They participate more frequently in the market process. This benefits their 
individual profits, but market efficiency, liquidity, and volatility also benefit from the increased 
presence of ‘cautious’ BIS traders, who are less likely to buy for prices that exceed fundamental 
values, and more likely to contribute to trading activity around the (new) fundamental value. For 
negative shocks, we do not observe any significant effects of market composition. 
Overall, this study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it provides evidence 
that two dimensions of motivational systems that are central to psychological research but have 
not yet been studied in a financial setting impact investors’ strategies and performance in 
(experimental) asset markets. Differences in BAS sensitivity had more pronounced effects on, for 
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example, portfolio structure than variations in other personality traits that have previously been 
studied, and were included as control variables, such as, for example, locus-of-control (McInish, 
1982). Second, this study analyzes the effect of investors’ personal characteristics in a novel 
trading environment: one that is subject to fundamental shocks. Third, it links individual-level 
variables to market outcomes, and documents a subtle pattern of effects with a market’s level of 
BIS sensitivity and its heterogeneity with respect to BAS sensitivity emerging as the strongest 
influences. Given the limited number of sessions, these market-level results should, however, be 
interpreted as exploratory, indicating a need for future research to corroborate and extend these 
first results. Another major task for future research is to probe whether our results generalize to 
other subject pools, including professional investors (e.g., Ackert and Church, 2001; Biais and 
Weber, 2009; Chen et al., 2007; Haigh and List, 2005; Lo et al., 2005). Further, moderating effects 
of market microstructure (Ackert et al., 2006; Theissen, 2000; O’Hara 1995) such as, for example, 
variations in short-selling rules (Ackert et al., 2006) should be investigated. Short selling—
especially in a shock environment—may appeal in particular to high BIS traders, implying that its 
inclusion might allow for obtaining a more comprehensive picture of the effects of differences in 
BAS/BIS sensitivity on trading strategies and performance.    
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Figure 1: Prices, order and trading volumes during treatment T1 (NORM) 
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Figure 2: Prices, order and trading volumes during treatment T2 (SHOCK) with positive shock 
(sub-treatment: T2-POST HI) 
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Figure 3: Prices, order and trading volumes during treatment T2 (SHOCK) with negative shock 
(sub-treatment: T2-POST LO) 
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    mean sd min max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 BAS 3.416 0.379 2.4 4 1                         
2 BIS 2.907 0.501 1.571 3.857 0.303* 1                       
3 Locus-of-control 11.18 4.33 2 23 -0.047 -0.347* 1                     
4 Thrill & adventure seeking 6.632 2.537 0 10 0.020 -0.226* 0.139 1                   
6 Self-monitoring 9.807 3.282 2 17 0.133 -0.183* 0.109 0.186* 0.03 1               
7 Loss aversion 4.415 1.422 1 7 0.058 0.111 -0.038 -0.164* -0.091 -0.049 1             
8 Risk attitude 4.193 1.861 1 10 0.056 -0.051 0.093 0.135 0.023 0.072 -0.256* 1           
9 Age 21.38 2.389 17 31 0.051 -0.004 0.059 -0.098 0.059 -0.031 0.117 -0.047 1         
10 Female 0.655 0.477 0 1 0.214* 0.337* -0.285* -0.229* -0.149 -0.107 0.212* -0.032 0.064 1       
11 Friends 0.234 0.425 0 1 -0.079 -0.117 0.052 0.084 -0.103 0.083 -0.048 0.011 -0.036 0.081 1     
12 Business_Economics 0.374 0.485 0 1 -0.164* -0.195* 0.177* 0.133 0.142 -0.009 -0.097 0.04 -0.230* -0.252* 0.087 1   
13 Master_PhD 0.503 0.501 0 1 -0.119 -0.004 0.025 0.067 0.016 0.036 -0.047 0.001 0.360* -0.057 -0.059 -0.077 1 
14 Financial experience 2.754 1.575 1 9 0.083 -0.115 0.084 0.023 -0.043 0.077 -0.031 -0.045 0.066 -0.208* -0.151* 0.244* 0.105 
* p=0.05; in pairwise correlation: traits standardized per session; mean, sd, min, max: unstandardized       
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 Normal trading (T1-NORM) 
No. of shares Trading 
profits 
Trading 
frequency 
Scalping 
frequency 
Scalping 
profits 
BAS 0.152*** 0.095*** 0.120*** 0.075** 0.03 
 [4.852] [2.371] [3.561] [2.069] [0.846] 
BIS -0.047 -0.093*** -0.04 -0.034 -0.092*** 
 [-1.168] [-2.917] [-1.071] [-0.928] [-3.257] 
Locus-of-control -0.058 0.042 0.064* 0.054 -0.002 
 [-1.644] [1.319] [1.723] [1.482] [-0.058] 
TAS -0.011 -0.001 0.072** 0.113*** -0.013 
 [-0.296] [-0.034] [2.262] [3.486] [-0.411] 
Self-monitoring 0.058* 0.072** -0.011 0.009 -0.001 
 [1.942] [2.380] [-0.332] [0.261] [-0.019] 
Loss aversion -0.120*** -0.029 0.023 0.057* 0.023 
 [-3.371] [-0.774] [0.839] [1.923] [0.585] 
Risk attitude 0.004 -0.048 0.132*** 0.117*** -0.052* 
 [0.115] [-1.387] [4.603] [3.788] [-1.773] 
Age -0.018 -0.188*** 0.057* 0.063* -0.181*** 
 [-0.470] [-4.583] [1.718] [1.693] [-4.209] 
Female 0.092 -0.237*** -0.168** -0.072 -0.208*** 
 [1.460] [-3.131] [-2.161] [-0.932] [-2.633] 
Friends 0.167*** -0.015 0.024 -0.024 -0.135* 
 [2.806] [-0.176] [0.425] [-0.394] [-1.686] 
Business_Economics 0.105 0.146** -0.158** -0.152** 0.094 
 [1.353] [1.683] [-2.513] [-2.467] [1.288] 
Master_PhD -0.034 0.194** -0.027 -0.06 0.069 
 [-0.453] [2.487] [-0.346] [-0.812] [1.037] 
Financial experience -0.017 -0.019 -0.088*** -0.066** -0.022 
 [-0.561] [-0.652] [-2.664] [-2.050] [-0.686] 
Market size -0.010** 0.019*** 0.004 0.001 0.021** 
 [-2.287] [3.058] [0.281] [0.105] [2.245] 
Intercept 0.118** -0.226*** -0.046 -0.015 -0.25** 
 [2.225] [-3.083] [-0.262] [-0.100] [-2.214] 
No. of 
observations 
1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026 
R2 0.05 0.091 0.065 0.054 0.059 
prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 [t-values in parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent (robust) standard errors 
(clustered) at market level] 
Table 2: Regression results for individual-level variables during normal trading (T1; NORM) 
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Variable  NORM (T1) 
(market level) RMSE 
(Efficiency) 
Bid-ask spread 
(Liquidity) 
s.d. of traded prices 
(Volatility) 
BAS median -27.88 [-0.746] 28.007 [0.604] 10.402 [0.560] 
BIS median -0.865 [-0.028] -53.485 [-1.297] -38.196** [-2.172] 
BAS kurtosis -14.373† [-1.647] -17.195*** [-3.084] -3.733 [-1.349] 
BIS kurtosis -22.881 [-1.482] 6.024 [0.388] -2.371 [-0.375] 
Intercept 214.837** [2.452] 142.283 [0.825] 104.256 [1.473] 
N 90 90 90 
R2 0.413 0.204 0.264 
prob > F 0.089 0.025 0.075 
Table 3: Regression results for effects of market composition (BIS, BAS) on market-level 
performance measures during normal trading (T1; NORM) († p<0.13, * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** 
p<0.01; [t-values in parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent (robust) standard errors (clustered) 
at session level]).  
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 Post-high shock trading – Pre-shock trading 
(T2-POST HI – PRE-SHOCK ) 
Post-
positive 
shock 
trading  
No. of 
shares 
Trading 
profits 
Trading 
frequency 
Scalping 
frequency 
Scalping 
profits 
Under-
reaction 
BAS 0.099* -0.022 -0.039 0.118*** -0.029 0.017 
 [2.064] [-0.303] [-0.702] [2.731] [-0.414] [0.233] 
BIS -0.034 0.170** 0.117* 0.005 0.027 -0.043 
 [-0.491] [2.076] [1.830] [0.100] [0.533] [-0.639] 
Locus-of-control 0.004 -0.045 0.106 -0.016 0.027 -0.077 
 [0.072] [-0.814] [1.554] [-0.276] [0.408] [-1.099] 
TAS 0.061 0.001 0.081 -0.091* -0.019 0.039 
 [1.093] [0.027] [1.587] [-1.941] [-0.354] [0.547] 
Self-monitoring 0.026 0.063 -0.073 -0.119*** -0.007 -0.017 
 [0.460] [0.789] [-1.602] [-3.001] [-0.142] [-0.253] 
Loss aversion -0.012 0.014 -0.041 -0.054 -0.097 0.079 
 [-0.175] [0.205] [-0.994] [-1.075] [-1.667] [1.562] 
Risk attitude -0.120* -0.053 -0.067 -0.100** -0.070** 0.086* 
 [-1.721] [-1.535] [-1.547] [-2.293] [-2.103] [-1.726] 
Age -0.069 -0.022 -0.151** -0.170** -0.066 0.098 
 [-1.161] [-1.014] [-2.506] [-2.591] [-1.314] [1.475] 
Female 0.015 -0.158* 0.072 -0.013 -0.078 0.15 
 [0.132] [-1.729] [0.555] [-0.106] [-0.590] [0.885] 
Friends -0.032 0.224** 0.123 0.157 -0.067 0.103 
 [-0.257] [2.293] [1.081] [1.607] [-0.592] [0.789] 
Business_Economics -0.194* -0.146 0.054 0.210** 0.044 -0.204* 
 [-1.981] [-1.637] [0.618] [2.450] [0.419] [-1.694] 
Master_PhD 0.094 -0.051 0.031 0.053 0.045 -0.097 
 [0.853] [-0.720] [0.291] [0.530] [0.383] [-0.754] 
Financial experience -0.033 0.073* 0.053 0.03 0.056 0.048 
 [-0.702] [1.821] [1.048] [0.719] [1.042] [0.737] 
Market size 0.004 -0.006 -0.009 -0.006 0.006 -0.017 
 [0.439] [-0.798] [-0.427] [-0.290] [0.445] [-0.409] 
Intercept -0.048 0.062 0.114 0.082 -0.07 0.188 
 [-0.443] [0.753] [0.452] [0.303] [-0.414] [0.387] 
No. of observations 455 455 455 455 455 275 
R2 0.038 0.045 0.061 0.089 0.027 0.05 
prob > F 0.004 0.009 0.005 0.000 0.333 0.032 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 [t-values in parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent (robust) standard errors 
(clustered) at market level] 
Table 4: Regression results for individual-level variables during post shock trading behavior 
following a positive shock (T2-POST HI) 
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 Post-low shock trading – Pre-shock trading 
(T2-POST LO – PRE-SHOCK ) 
Post-
positive 
shock 
trading 
No. of 
shares 
Trading 
profits 
Trading 
frequency 
Scalping 
frequency 
Scalping 
profits 
Under-
reaction 
BAS 0.170*** -0.124 0.101* 0.023 -0.081 0.134** 
 [3.534] [-1.547] [1.779] [0.423] [-1.441] [2.283] 
BIS -0.012 0.073 0.068 0.073 -0.014 0.034 
 [-0.216] [1.380] [1.126] [1.473] [-0.283] [0.487] 
Locus-of-control -0.006 0.031 0.05 0.136*** -0.026 -0.019 
 [-0.117] [0.470] [0.946] [2.758] [-0.430] [-0.279] 
TAS -0.013 0.031 0.015 -0.054 0.016 -0.028 
 [-0.239] [0.407] [0.346] [-1.064] [0.344] [-0.446] 
Self-monitoring 0.004 -0.121** 0.001 -0.076* 0.004 -0.03 
 [0.086] [-2.610] [0.013] [-1.987] [0.085] [-0.674] 
Loss aversion 0.011 0.043 0.051 0.029 -0.056 0.07 
 [0.223] [0.642] [1.074] [0.649] [-1.430] [1.355] 
Risk attitude 0.035 -0.097 0.109** 0.035 0.05 0.074 
 [0.684] [-1.379] [2.586] [0.705] [1.120] [1.675] 
Age 0.143*** 0.048 0.025 0.011 0.145*** -0.034 
 [3.553] [0.666] [0.426] [0.183] [2.814] [-0.586] 
Female -0.216* 0.353*** -0.349*** -0.182 0.037 -0.157 
 [-1.951] [2.835] [-2.559] [-1.553] [0.317] [-1.105] 
Friends -0.083 0.112 -0.045 0.019 -0.023 0.189 
 [-0.838] [0.978] [-0.476] [0.159] [-0.203] [1.353] 
Business_Economics 0.358*** -0.284 0.089 0.097 -0.047 -0.1 
 [3.652] [-1.641] [0.904] [0.974] [-0.533] [-0.909] 
Master_PhD 0.072 0.082 -0.242** -0.233** -0.051 0.087 
 [0.721] [0.657] [-2.360] [-2.115] [-0.608] [0.716] 
Financial experience -0.075 0.079 -0.025 0.01 0.134*** 0.042 
 [-1.610] [1.144] [-0.516] [0.208] [3.001] [0.713] 
Market size 0.012** -0.025*** 0.014 0.005 -0.01 -0.006 
 [2.152] [-2.784] [0.686] [0.277] [-0.573] [-0.208] 
Intercept -0.137** 0.301*** -0.167 -0.065 0.117 0.068 
 [-2.038] [2.803] [-0.694] [-0.277] [0.609] [0.182] 
N 571 571 571 571 571 368 
R2 0.063 0.056 0.064 0.052 0.045 0.033 
prob > F 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.042 0.396 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 [t-values in parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent (robust) standard errors 
(clustered) at market level] 
Table 5: Regression results for individual-level variables during post shock trading behavior 
following a negative shock (T2-POST LO) 
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Variable  (a) Post-high shock trading – Pre-shock trading (T2) (T2-POST HI – PRE-SHOCK ) 
(market level) RMSE 
(Efficiency) 
Bid-ask spread 
(Liquidity) 
s.d. of traded prices 
(Volatility) 
BAS median -30.426 [-1.132] 23.923 [0.692] -14.569 [-0.760] 
BIS median -83.429*** [-3.930]] -55.674* [-1.885] -36.751* [-1.904] 
BAS kurtosis 3.949 [0.845] 0.239 [0.045] -0.788 [-0.331] 
BIS kurtosis 14.684 [1.663] -9.162 [-0.775] -7.555 [-1.204] 
Intercept 309.377** [2.885]] 130.133 [0.792] 191.108** [2.245] 
N 40 40 40 
R2 0.264 0.156 0.161 
prob > F 0.009 0.009 0.001 
Variable  (b) Post-low shock trading – Pre-shock trading (T2) (T2-POST LO – PRE-SHOCK ) 
(market level) RMSE 
(Efficiency) 
Bid-ask spread 
(Liquidity) 
s.d. of traded prices 
(Volatility) 
BAS median 7.674 [0.285] 18.580 [0.531] -4.808 [-0.304] 
BIS median -7.398 [-0.213] -18.052 [-0.412] -15.087 [-0.548]] 
BAS kurtosis 3.672 [0.441] 6.832 [0.825] -1.094 [-0.214] 
BIS kurtosis 21.695 [1.550] 15.144 [1.225] 13.009 [1.412] 
Intercept -72.479 [-0.782] -60.368 [-0.663] 37.433 [0.611] 
N 50 50 50 
R2 0.171 0.125 0.107 
prob > F 0.295 0.535 0.444 
Table 6: Regression results for effects of market composition (BIS, BAS) on market-level 
performance measures during (a) POST-SHOCK trading vs. PRE-SHOCK trading following a 
positive shock, and (b) POST-SHOCK trading vs. PRE-SHOCK trading following a negative 
shock (* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; [t-values in parentheses; heteroskedasticity-consistent 
(robust) standard errors (clustered) at session level]). Results for all post-pre shock trading 
comparisons are qualitatively robust to the use of standardized measures. 
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Appendix A1. 
Table A1: Individual-level control variables (corresponding to tables II-VI)20 
Variable Measurement scale Source/ 
definition 
Cronbach’s 
α  
Minimum possible 
score 
Maximum possible 
score 
Locus-of-control 23 forced-choice items  Rotter (1966) .756 0 (external) 23 (internal) 
Thrill and 
Adventure Seeking 
(TAS)  
Ten forced binary choice items Sub-scale from 
Zuckerman’s updated 
Sensation Seeking Scale V; 
Zuckerman (1979, 1994) 
.736 0 (low TAS) 10 (high TAS) 
Self-monitoring 18 forced binary choice items Snyder and Gangestad’s 
Improved Self-Monitoring 
Scale (Snyder and 
Gangestad, 1986) 
.653 0 18 
Loss aversion Six lotteries (accept or reject) Gächter et al. (2007) N.A. 1  
(low loss aversion) 
7  
(high loss aversion) 
Risk attitude Ten choices between paired 
lotteries, A and B 
Low-payoff treatment by 
Holt and Laury (2002);  
reversed scores 
N.A. 1 (risk averse) 10 (risk seeking) 
Risk neutrality = 6 
Age In years N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Female 1/0 N.A. N.A. 0 1 
Friends 1/0 N.A. N.A. 0 1 
Business_Economics 1/0 N.A. N.A. 0 1 
Master_PhD 1/0 N.A. N.A. 0 1 
Financial experience 9-point Likert score (1= ‘I do 
not agree’ to 9= ‘I fully agree’) 
N.A. N.A. 1 9 
Market size In number of persons Number of subjects in a 
market (session) 
N.A. N.A. N.A. 
                                               
20
 For all scales using several items, we established that the measurements are distinct, using confirmatory factor analyses. We ran reliability tests and common factor analyses per 
scale. Based on the results, we do not exclude any items from the original scales. Risk aversion, loss aversion and all personality variables are mean-centered and standardized at the 
market (session) level. 
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Appendix A2. 
Table A2: Differences between sessions and market types 
Session Number 
of traders 
NORM 
(T1) 
PRE-SHOCK 
(T2-PRE) 
POST-SHOCK 
High shock 
(T2-POST HI) 
Low shock 
(T2-POST LO) 
# Trades Price # Trades Price # Trades Price # Trades Price 
1 15 15.2 211.013 7.756 214.15 6.6 337.276 6.133 81.821 
2 14 15.119 128.284 7.452 125.34 4.714 296.939 6.19 91.399 
3 13 10.051 206.205 4.256 201.845 2.769 330.939 3.487 64.189 
4 12 5.222 230.435 3.722 222.749 1.667 335.1 2.833 49.264 
5 12 8.278 202.18 5.639 202.083 2.889 344.321 3.889 55.829 
6 14 6.69 178.591 3.786 176.771 2.476 348.449 4 48.045 
7 9 10.481 187.21 6.185 185.714 3.5 331.357 5.778 50.339 
8 12 7.333 197.705 4.778 196.826 2.556 343.437 4.944 48.05 
9 12 13.25 254.835 5.194 254.401 3.583 340.647 5.625 57.949 
10 8 10.083 155.655 5.833 151.452 4.5 264.444 6.4 58.452 
11 10 7.733 242.132 2.933 248.081 3.1 348.359 3.75 53.297 
12 10 7.933 188.14 4 190.86 3.333 328.107 2.067 58.753 
13 10 8.333 169.129 5.1 169.029 2.8 316.136 5.75 54.589 
14 10 12.133 95.343 4.467 134.534 2.6 355.543 5.4 90.37 
15 10 5.8 179.568 4.333 164.737 2.44 338.602 4.8 59.125 
All 11.4 (171) 9.75 189.691 5.097 190.257 3.358 331.72 4.727 62.159 
Averages per subject:         
Avg. trading frequency 9.75  5.097  3.358  4.727  
Avg. scalping frequency 3.395  1.262  0.888  1.016  
Avg. market price 189.691  190.257  331.72  62.159  
 
 
